Highlights  A DEA model is proposed for preferential voting with abstentions.
Introduction
In the industrial engineering discipline, decision making plays a key role in properly managing complex social, economic, and engineering systems such as group decision support (Beruvides, 1995) , product development partner selection (Büyüközkan and Güleryüz, 2016) , and ballot system design (Sivagami et al., 2011) . Group decision-making (GDM) (Arrow, 1950; Fishburn, 1970) is the process of aggregating multiple decision-makers' (DMs') preferences over different alternatives into a compromised collective preference order for an entire group according to some rules (Hwang and Lin, 2012) .
GDM has a number of advantages: It helps to obtain more complete information and knowledge from different perspectives, generate more feasible alternatives, improve the group's acceptance of alterna-tives, and enhance the legitimacy of the decision making process. Thus, GDM can be a valuable tool to avoid individual irrational decisions caused by "bounded rationality" (Simon, 1991) , risk aversion or risk appetite (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) . Based on a Bayesian approach, Altuzarra et al. (2010) constructed an AHP-group decision model for the consensus reaching process. On the other hand, GDM is not immune to pitfalls. For instance, it may lead to dangerous tendencies such as "groupthink" (Janis, 1972) , "group polarization" (Stoner, 1961) , and "escalation of commitment" (Myers and Lamm, 1975) . To counter this downside risk, an experienced moderator with a global view of the issue at hand may be introduced to help avert these tendencies and improve decision results and the consensus reaching process (Palomares et al., 2014; Tan et al., 2017a,b; Zhang et al., 2017; Gong and Wang, 2017) .
A preferential election is a special GDM process where multiple individuals participate in the voting process (decision analysis), establish decision (voting) rules, select appropriate methods for aggregating individual decisions (information aggregation), and choose a satisfactory alternative for the group (alternative selection). Three main processes are involved in a preferential election:
(1) Aggregating the voting information. Information aggregation is expected to satisfy the systematicity and integrity requirements of voting systems by exploiting different methods such as aggregation operators (i.e., weighted average operators), regression analysis, and function simulations (González-Pachón and Romero, 1999; Hummel, 2011; Bouton et al., 2015) .
(2) Constructing voting rules. Efficient voting rules must be adaptable to different voting scenarios and help to improve the fairness of the voting process (Chandrasekher, 2015; Burnett and Kogan, 2015; Procaccia et al., 2016) .
(3) Optimizing voting alternatives (i.e., voting system efficiency). An efficient voting system is expected to maximize the use of voting information, to obtain the best result based on an optimization model (Angiz et al., 2012; Gans and Smart, 1996; Tavares, 2012) .
Generally speaking, the value of a voting system can be measured by its efficiency. The DEA model is a well known tool for evaluating efficiency because it takes a systematic approach to aggregate each candidate's score by incorporating the voting system information to optimize variable weights and ensure the rationality of voting ranks. As such, Cook and Kress (1990) proposed to use a DEA model to aggregate preferential ranking with a focus on the efficiency of a voting system. The research question therein is to select k members out of m candidates and rank them according to the importance of their places. Subsequently, Cook et al. (1997) presented a general distance-based consensus framework for deriving ordinal ranking. To solve the problem of preference ranking, Wang et al. (2005 Wang et al. ( , 2007 put forward an interval utility function and ordered weight averaging operators. Gong et al. (2015a) constructed consensus models to deal with interval preference opinions and interpreted their economic significance. Franceschini and Maisano (2015) introduced a new quantitative tool to check the consistency of the solution in ordinal semi-democratic decision-making problems. By integrating interval 2-tuple linguistic TOPSIS into DEA, Geng at al. (2016) investigated a component oriented remanufacturing decision-making problem. Over the past 20 years, voting efficiency also attracted significant interests from many researchers (Oukil and Amin, 2015; Ebrahimnejad et al., 2016; Llamazares and Pena, 2009; Sun and Ma, 2015) .
In recent elections, low turnout ratios have been a consistent and notorious problem. To increase turnouts, different measures have been proposed. For instance, some jurisdictions have experimented with mandatory voting. It has been observed that these measures often result in a large number of invalid ballots and abstentions (Power and Roberts, 1995) . It is understandable that these votes may have a significant effect on the voting result depending upon whether they can be converted to approval votes. For instance, we often observe different social media conduct polls prior to the final preferential voting and predict who will win/lose the election. In their questionnaires, undecided is typically one of the choices for potential voters who take the survey. These undecided votes can be conveniently characterized as interval-valued voting counts. During the campaign, the candidates can then use the poll results to adjust their running strategies and launch advertisements to influence those undecided voters. Our proposed models can be of use for the runners and their managers in allocating their campaign resources to maximize their chance of winning over these uncertain voters. Building upon Borda's (1784) voting method and Cook and Kress (1990) 's DEA model, this paper firstly proposes a novel preferential voting paradigm to incorporate abstentions (hereafter, invalid ballots are treated as abstentions in this article) by introducing interval values for the raw vote counts where the interval width measures the magnitude of abstention votes. Furthermore, since voting efficiency evaluation aims to adequately aggregate the voting information, the derived result presumably represents the collective choice of the voters. From this perspective, the voting process can be treated as a consensus decision problem, which is an active research topic in the industrial engineering field. For instance, recent studies examined consistency and consensus with different types of decision input such as hesitant fuzzy linguistic preference relations (Wu and Xu, 2015; Wang and Gong, 2017) , interval fuzzy preference relations (Meng et al., 2016) , and heterogeneous preference relations (Chen et al., 2015) . Labella et al. (2017) conducted a comparative analysis of the performance of classical consensus models in large-scale GDM.
Contemporary elections have presented a common scenario in which different lobby groups, think tanks, and opinion leaders express their opinions on the candidates and some may even launch campaigns to promote their preferred candidate and/or undermine others. Their goal is to influence voters so that their preferred candidate can be elected as the winner. To properly consider their role in an election, a second proposal is presented in this paper that explicitly introduces them into a consensus decision model Wu et al., 2018 Wu et al., , 2017 and collectively refers them to as a moderator (Ben-Arieh and Easton, 2007; Herrera-Viedma et al., 2007; Gong et al., 2015a) . Consistent with the idea in (Dong et al., 2018) , where a moderator can strategically manipulate attribute weights or allocate resources to obtain her/his desired alternatives' ranking, this second novel approach, a socalled moderator-involved consensus preferential voting (MICPV) model, aims to achieve consensus between the moderator's expectations and the voters' aggregate voting scores of the candidates by minimizing their deviations. This type of research and treatment has been widely used in industrial engineering and engineering management. We also explore the economic significance of different model components in MICPV and its dual models using the primal-dual linear programming theory.
Key features of both proposed models are:
(a) Abstentions are allowed and accommodated by allowing raw voting counts to assume interval values. Without loss of generality, invalid ballots are treated as abstentions in this article.
(b) The place weights differ and are functions of a discriminating factor.
(c) The objective function of the primal model minimizes the difference between the moderator's expected scores and the weighted voting scores for all candidates. The purpose is to reach the highest possible consensus between the moderator's opinion and those of the voters.
(d) The objective function of the dual model aims to measure the total utility that the moderator's opinion influences the voting scores of the candidates.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces Cook and Kress's DEA model for aggregating preference rankings. Section 3 presents a generalization of the DEA model allowing for abstentions. Section 4 proposes an MICPV model with abstentions. Different primal and dual linear programs are also discussed for the consensus reaching process. Section 5 explores economic significance of key model components. Illustrative examples are provided in Section 6 to analyze a hypothetical preferential voting scenario with and without a moderator's influence. The paper concludes with some remarks in Section 7.
Background
In Cook and Kress (1990) 's DEA model, there exist k places in a preferential election. Each voter must select k winners from m candidates in a preferential order of their places. Assume that the vote
. . , k}, and the importance of place j is ω j . Then, the candidate i's overall score is W i = k j=1 ω j v ij . Specifically, for a particular candidate i 0 ∈ M , to determine an optimal set of {ω * j } that maximizes his/her weighted score W i 0 , Cook and Kress (1990) proposed to employ the following DEA model for aggregating preference ranking (DEA voting model):
Constraint (1-1) indicates that the upper bound for any candidate i's score is 1. Constraints (1-2) and (1-3) put restrictions on the weights of the places. The importance of the places are listed in a descending order, where the lower bound d(j, ε) on the gap between the importance of two successive places is referred to as the discrimination intensity function. The parameter ε is called the discrimination factor. Assume that d(j, ε) = f (j)ε is a monotonically non-decreasing linear function, and f (j) is a positive constant with respect to j. The objective function is candidate i 0 's weighted voting score (hereinafter referred to as score) k j=1 ω j v i 0 j , which is to be maximized.
The characteristics of the DEA voting model can be briefly summarized as follows:
(a) The place weights are objectively determined as an optimal solution to the DEA voting model. it is noted in Section 1, a large number of invalid ballots and abstentions often arise in elections. To make the aforesaid DEA model more applicable, Section 3 proposes a preferential voting DEA model with abstentions. The voting score of candidate i in place j, v ij , assumes an interval value, where the interval width (distance between the lower and the upper bounds of the interval) is the maximum number of invalid votes or abstentions. The optimal weight of candidate i in place j is obtained by using a DEA method, thereby determining the final candidate ranking.
A preferential voting DEA model with abstentions
In a preferential election with abstentions, k places are vacant. Each voter selects k winners from m candidates and ranks them accordingly. Assume the voting score interval of candidate i in place j is
and v U ij denote the lower and upper bounds of votes for candidate i in place
is the number of uncertain votes, which may be valid abstentions or invalid ballots. Understandably, at an aggregate level, voters often have different opinions toward the same candidate in different places, and the number of uncertain votes (or interval widths) for the same candidate can vary considerably for distinct places. For instance, if the interval voting score for candidate 1 in place 1 is [2, 6] , then at least 2 and at most 6 voters vote candidate 1 in place 1; while candidate 1 obtains an interval voting score of [1, 7] in place 2 , then at least 1 and at most 7 voters vote the same candidate in place 2. When α ij = 0, none of the uncertain votes is treated as approval of candidate i in place j, providing the minimum votes v L ij . Conversely, when α ij = 1, all uncertain votes are viewed as approvals of candidate i in place j, providing the upper bound of possible votes v U ij . Thus, α ij indicates the allocation scheme of uncertain votes for candidate i in place j, and the adjusted number of votes is
after uncertain votes are reallocated. As α ij represents how the uncertain votes are reallocated as approval votes for candidate i in place j, for the same candidate i, the allocation schemes α ij are independently determined for different places j's and α i1 , α i2 , and α ik are independent of each other.
Additionally, the importance of place j is denoted by ω j , and the weighted score of candidate i is given
A preferential voting DEA model with abstentions is thus proposed as
The k place weights (ω k , k ∈ K) can be objectively obtained using Model (2). Then, candidate i 0 's overall score is calculated as a weighted average of the optimal interval values ([v L i 0 j , v U i 0 j ]). A final ranking for all candidates can then be determined by their overall scores.
Model (2) is nonlinear. Let m ij ω j α ij , as 0 ≤ α ij ≤ 1, we have 0 ≤ m ij ≤ ω j , then Model (2) is transformed into linear programming Model (3) as follows:
Theorem 1. For any i 0 ∈ M , Z i 0 (ε) is a monotonically non-increasing function of ε.
Proof. For any given ε and ε ′ , ε ′ ≥ ε ≥ 0, as d(j, ε ′ ) = f (j)ε ′ and d(j, ε) = f (j)ε, and f (j) > 0, we have d(j, ε ′ ) ≥ d(j, ε). Let ϕ(ε) and ϕ(ε ′ ) be the feasible region of Model (3). Then, it implies that
Theorem 1 shows that the smaller the discrimination factor ε, the bigger the candidate's overall score, i.e., reducing the discrimination factor decreases the gaps among the place weights and makes places more competitive. For a particular candidate, places with more votes tend to be assigned heavier weights, thereby increasing the candidate's overall score.
Proof. ε ≤ ε ′ and Z i 0 (ε) is a monotonically non-increasing function, so Z i 0 (ε) ≥ Z i 0 (ε ′ ) = 1. From Constraint (3-1), one has Z i 0 (ε) ≤ 1. As such Z i 0 (ε) = 1.
Equivalently, for ε, ε ′ ≥ 0, if Z i 0 (ε ′ ) = 1 and Z i 0 (ε) < 1, then ε > ε ′ .
Corollary 1 shows a higher discrimination factor increases the differences between place weights and makes the places less competitive. In this case, places with relatively high votes tend to be assigned smaller weights, thereby decreasing the candidate's weighted score.
. If the discrimination factor ε falls within a certain range, Theorem 2 demonstrates that there must exist a candidate who achieves the highest score, implying that Model (3) can always find a winning candidate.
Theorem 3. ε * max is the largest value of ε such that Model (3) is still feasible. Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that ε * max < ∞. We prove this theorem by contradiction. Let ε > ε * max , and there exists a feasible solution ω = (w 1 , . . . , ω k ) T to Model (3) with a discrimination factor ε. According to the definition of ε * max , we have Z i (ε) < 1 for all i ∈ M . The dual of primal Model (3) is
From the principle of complementary slackness, the optimal solution to Model (4) is x * 1 = · · · = x * m = 0, which contradicts (4-1) or (4-2). This completes the proof.
The contrapositive of Theorem 3: If there does not exist a feasible solution to Model (3), then the discrimination factor ε exceeds the maximum ε * max , implying that the difference between place weights f (j)ε * max exceeds an upper bound. Theorem 3 establishes an upper bound ε * max for the discrimination factor such that a feasible solution exists for Model (3). Model (3) will not be able to identify the best candidate if the discrimination factor exceeds ε * max (i.e., the difference between two successive place weights exceeds a certain threshold).
Clearly, the discrimination factor affects the place weights and ultimately influences candidates' scores. Therefore, it is convenient to explore how sensitive place weights and the optimal choice of the candidate are affected by the discrimination factor. Additionally, at the maximum discrimination factor ε max , two drawbacks of the Cook and Kress DEA model can be overcome: (i) different candidates will receive distinct scores and (ii) unified place weights will be derived for all candidates. Thus, a preferential voting model with abstentions is introduced below to maximize the discrimination factor:
Theorem 4. For an optimal solution to Model (5), at least one of the constraints in (5-1) is binding and holds as an equality.
Proof. According to Theorem 3, the optimal objective value of Model (5) is ε * max , which satisfies all the constraints. Assume that
< 1 holds for all i ∈ M under the optimal solution to Model (5), its dual model is given as
Based on the principle of complementary slackness, the optimal solution to Model (6) is x * 1 = · · · = x * m = 0. Then, either (6-1) or (6-2) in Model (6) is violated. Therefore, there exists i 0 such that
Theorem 4 indicates that the optimal discrimination factor guarantees the existence of a candidate with the highest score in a voting system with abstentions.
Theorem 5. Under the optimal solution to Model (5), all the constraints in (5-2) and (5-3) are binding.
Proof. Denote Model (5)'s optimal solution by
If there exists at least an i ∈ {i|v L ij = 0, i ∈ I 0 }, then there must exist one j 0 such that m * ij 0 = ω * j 0 α * ij 0 = 0 and
In sum, there must exist one j such that
From Eqs. (7) and (8), if ∀i ∈ I 0 , we have
T is also an optimal solution to Model (5).
Consequently, from Eqs. (9) and (10), we conclude that all constraints in (5-1) are non-binding, which contradicts Theorem 4.
Theorem 5 demonstrates that, when the discrimination factor is maximized, the place weight differences reach the lower bound of the discrimination intensity function. In this case, different candidates receive distinct scores. Thus, Model (6) can be viewed as an effective evaluation model for ranking candidates.
A moderator-involved-consensus preferential voting model with abstentions
Section 3 extends Cook and Kress's preferential voting DEA model (1990) to allow for abstentions by assuming interval values for candidates' raw votes. The model assumes that each voter casts his/her ballot on his/her own consideration without external influences. However, in many elections around the globe nowadays, it is typical that influential opinion leaders publish their preferences on different candidates and try to influence the voters' decision. These opinion leaders usually represent certain interests and are often knowledgeable about the issues at hand. They may exploit their resources to launch campaigns on different media to support their preferred candidate and undermine competitors before the voters go to the poll to cast their ballots. It is understandable that their purpose is to influence the voters' opinion so that their preferred candidate can receive the best voting score. In this section, we shall extend the model in Section 3 by explicitly considering the role of opinion leaders in preferential voting. This idea is consistent with the notion of leader's role in opinion dynamics in (Dong et al., 2017) . Following the terminology used in (Ben-Arieh and Easton, 2007; Herrera-Viedma et al., 2007; Gong et al., 2015a,b) , opinion leaders are referred to as a moderator hereafter (Palomares et al., 2014) . From the moderator's perspective, he/she expects that the voters consider both their individual and his/her opinions. His/her objective is to reach a consensus between the voters and him/herself so that his/her expected ranking can be realized or approximated as much as possible through the voting process. In the proposed MICPV model, the objective is to minimize the deviation between the moderator's expected score and the weighted voting score for each candidate subject to various constraints on place weights. In the proposed model, it is assumed that the moderator's expected score for candidate i is o i , i ∈ M , and the interval value of the votes for candidate
For instance, o 1 = 7 means the moderator's expected score for candidate 1 is 7. Similar to Section 3, v L ij and v U ij denote the lower and upper bounds of votes for candidate i in place j and the interval
, where 0 ≤ α ij ≤ 1 and can be interpreted in the same way as before. Under the influence of the moderator, the voting result tends to come closer to the expected score of the moderator. The closer the candidate i's overall weighted score
, the better the voting result obtained by the moderator in terms of his/her expectation.
In other words, the moderator can adjust the importance (or weights) of the places to influence the voters, thereby making the voting score
approach o i , and achieving the best voting consensus. Therefore, an MICPV model with abstentions is formulated as
In Model (11), the objective function can be interpreted as the overall consensus degree between the moderator's expectation and all voters' aggregate voting scores for all candidates. A smaller m i=1 d i (ω j , α ij ) corresponds to a higher consensus. The place weights ω j satisfy constraints (11-1)-(11-3).
Let
Thus, Model (11) is equivalent to the following linear programming model:
Theorem 6. W (ε) is a monotonically non-decreasing function of ε.
Proof. For any given ε and ε ′ , ε ′ ≥ ε ≥ 0, let ϕ(ε), ϕ(ε ′ ), respectively, be the feasible region of
Recall that the smaller the objective function in Model (12), the higher the consensus level. Theorem 6 shows that the consensus level increases as the discrimination factor decreases. This article assumes that d(j, ε) = f (j)ε, where f (j) is a nonnegative constant. So, a reduction in ε leads to smaller gaps among the place weights. Therefore, the consensus level can be improved by reducing ε or the differences between place weights. Since ε affects the consensus level, the following three scenarios are considered for the place weight constraints in the MICPV model with abstentions.
1. Nonnegative place weight constraints (ω j ≥ 0, ε = 0, j ∈ K);
2. Lower bound place weight constraints (ω j ≥ ε, ε > 0, j ∈ K) and;
3. Descending place weight constraints (ω j − ω j+1 ≥ d(j, ε), j = 1, . . . , k − 1, ω k ≥ d(k, ε)).
Specific properties of these three cases and their dual models are established next in Sections 4.1-4.3.
An MICPV Model with Abstentions under Nonnegative Place Weight Constraints
With nonnegative place weight constraints, Model (11) can be simplified to
Let m ij ω j α ij . Model (13) is converted to an equivalent linear programming Model (14):
The dual of Model (14) is
The following theorems or properties are mainly derived by the principle of complementary slackness from the primal-dual linear programming theory. They are useful in our economic significance interpretations of MICPV models with abstentions in Section 5.
It is understandable that each place weight satisfies ω j > 0. According to the principle of
• When (i, j) ∈ A 1 . As m ij = 0 and ω j − m ij > 0, we have n ij = 0. On the other hand,
From Eqs. (16) and (17), we have
, a i = 0 and b i > 0. According to the complementary slackness property, y i = 1. If i ∈ I 2 , we can similarly show that y i = −1.
Theorem 7. Let w * j , m * ij be the optimal solution to Model (14), if I 0 = ∅ then
Proof. If I 0 = ∅, I 1 ∪ I 2 = M . According to Corollary 2,
]}y i = 0. As per Corollary 3, when i ∈ I 1 ,
]. Theorem 7 implies that, if the moderator's opinion always differs from the candidates' aggregate voting scores, then the candidates' uncertain scores will be evenly split into two parts, where the sum of the underachieved scores obtained by all candidates in I 1 is equal to that of the overachieved scores in I 2 .
Theorem 8. Let ω * j , m * ij be the optimal solution to Model (14). Dual Model (15) is equivalent to:
]}y i = 0. From the primal and dual models (14) and (18), one can prove that the voting intervals incorporating abstentions have the following three properties.
Let I + {i|y i > 0}, I − {i|y i < 0}, and I 0 {i|y i = 0}.
which implies that there are no abstentions for placing candidate i at j, in this case, it is irrelevant what value α ij assumes and we can simply let α ij = 1. Otherwise, as (v U ij − v L ij )y i − n ij ≤ 0, one has n ij > 0. According to the principle of complementary slackness, we have ω j − m ij = 0 and α ij = 1.
Property 1 indicates that when y i > 0, all abstentions of candidate i in place j are treated as approval votes.
Property 2. If i ∈ I − , α ij = 0.
Proof. When i ∈ I − (i.e., y i < 0), we have (v U ij − v L ij )y i − n ij < 0. According to the principle of complementary slackness, we have m ij = 0 and α ij = 0. Property 2 implies that, when y i < 0, none of the abstentions of candidate i in place j is treated as approval votes.
Property 3. If i ∈ I 0 , a i = b i = 0 and 0 < α ij < 1.
Proof. If i ∈ I 0 , y i = 0. Since −1 < y i < 1, according to the principle of complementary slackness, we have a i = b i = 0. As such, 0 < α ij < 1.
Property 3 shows that, if y i = 0, a complete consensus between the moderator's expectation and the aggregate score for candidate i can be achieved by properly allocating all uncertain votes (i.e., adjusting the value of α ij ).
An MICPV Model with Abstentions under Lower Bound Place Weight Constraints
Under lower bound place weight constraints, Model (11) can be simplified to
Let m ij ω j α ij , Model (19) is equivalent to the linear programming Model (20):
The dual of Model (21) is
The following results are derived based on the principle of complementary slackness in the primaldual linear programming theory.
Proof. It is clear that the place weights satisfy ω j > 0 for all j ∈ K. According to complementary slackness,
• (i, j) ∈ A 1 : In this case, m ij = ω j α ij = 0 and z j − m ij > −ε, we have p ij = 0. Thus,
Combining the aforesaid three cases,
Adding Eqs. (23) and (24), we have
εp ij . Plugging z j = ω j − ε into this equation and rearranging the terms, one has
we have a i = 0 and b i > 0. Based on the complementary slackness property, h i = 1. Similarly, if i ∈ I 2 , h i = −1.
Theorem 9. Let z * j , m * ij be the optimal solution to Model (21). Dual Model (22) is equivalent to:
where ω * j = z * j + ε is the optimal solution to Model (21).
Proof. From Corollary 4, we have
An MICPV Model with Abstentions under Descending Place Weight Constraints
This subsection presents an MICPV model with abstentions and descending place weight con-
In this case, Model (11) is equivalent to Model (12) and the dual of Model (12) is:
In a similar fashion, as per complementary slackness in the primal-dual linear programming theory, we obtain the following results.
Proof. Similarly, the place weights satisfy ω j > 0, j ∈ K. By the principle of complementary
• (i, j) ∈ A 1 : In this case, m ij = 0 and ω j −m ij > 0, we have q ij = 0. Thus,
• (i, j) ∈ A 3 : Here, as m ij = ω j α ij > 0 and ω j − m ij > 0, we have (v U ij − v L ij )d i − q ij = 0 and q ij = 0, meaning that
Adding Eqs. (27) and (28), we have
• If d(j, ε) = 0, in this case, ω j − ω j+1 > 0, j = 1, 2, · · · , k − 1 and ω k > 0, we have x j = 0. Thus,
• If d(j, ε) > 0, denote J 1 {j|x j = 0, j = k} and J 2 {j|x j > 0, j = k}.
-j ∈ J 1 : As x j = 0, we have
Thus, we have
We have two cases for x k :
-if x k = 0, we have ω k x k = 0 and d(k, ε)x k = 0, so ω k x k = d(k, ε)x k ; and
Therefore,
Adding Eqs. (31) and (32), we have
Combining Eqs. (30) and (33), we have
Consequently, plugging (34) into (29) yields
, we have a i = 0 and b i > 0. According to the complementary slackness property, d i = 1. If i ∈ I 2 , we prove that d i = −1 in a similar fashion.
Theorem 10. Let ω * j , m * ij be the optimal solution to Model (12). The dual Model (26) is equivalent to:
Proof. From Corollary 6, we have
Economic significance of MICPV models with abstentions
This section focuses on the economic significance of Model (14), its dual Model (15) and its equivalence (18). The other two scenarios of the place weight constraints in the MICPV model given in Section 4.2 and 4.3 can be interpreted in a similar fashion.
(5.1) Economic significance of the preferential voting models with abstentions
• Without considering the moderator, the proposed preferential voting DEA model with abstentions focuses on obtaining the optimal aggregated scores for candidates under different constraints on place weights.
• By incorporating the moderator, the MICPV model with abstentions devotes to achieving the overall consensus between the moderator's expectation and all candidates' aggregate voting scores. At the same time, the model can also help to rank the candidates and select a winner. o i y i can be interpreted as the overall optimal value of the moderator's opinions on all candidates. As y i = ∂W ∂o i , it can be considered as the marginal value of the moderator's opinion on candidate i. This formulation reflects that the value of the moderator is accomplished by influencing voters' preferences. In other words, the presence of the moderator is able to influence the weighted average voting scores obtained by the candidates. Therefore, y i in (15) characterizes the marginal value of the moderator's opinion in changing candidate i's score, and the objective function in (15) gauges the overall influence of the moderator's opinion on all candidates' votes.
• The dual variables in Model (18) can be further interpreted as the marginal utility of the moderator's influence on candidate i's score.
Theorem 8 establishes the equivalence of Model (15) and Model (18), so the optimal solution
denotes the optimal votes of candidate i in place j after accounting for abstentions, and
represents candidate i's optimal weighted voting score for all places. Mathematically,
] measures the deviation between the moderator's expectation for candidate i and the candidate's performance in the voting, and y i is a partial derivative of W ,
Consequently, y i can also be interpreted as the marginal utility of the moderator's influence on the candidate i's score S i (ω j , α ij ), and
]}y * i as the total utility of the moderator's influence on all candidates. Next we shall discuss the implications of this influence on different categories of candidates.
(5.3) A partition of candidates based on the moderator's influence over the voters
]}, which are referred to as, from the moderator's perspective, consistent, underachieved, and overachieved candidates, respectively. Obviously, I 0 ∪I 1 ∪I 2 = M . [
, thereby closing in the gap between the moderator's expectation and candidate i's performance. As per Corollary 3, y i = 1 > 0, we have α ij = 1 by Property 1. This indicates that, to minimize the deviation
, all abstentions casted for underachieved candidate i should be converted to approval votes, thereby achieving maximum consensus level between the moderator's expectation and the weighted voting score for this underachieved candidate i. The significance of the expression in (36 − 2) is that, to maximize the influence of the moderator, all uncertain votes for those candidates whose voting scores underperform the moderator's expectations should be ascribed to approval votes.
(ii) For an overachieved candidate i ∈ I 2 , the moderator does not think that he/she deserves such a high vote. In this case, if all uncertain votes [v L ij , v U ij ] are reallocated, since m ij = ω j α ij , a smaller α ij brings down his/her score
, thereby leading to a smaller deviation between the moderator's opinion and the voters' aggregate choice.
Based on Corollary 3, y i = −1 < 0, thus we have α ij = 0 according to Property 2. This indicates that, to minimize the deviation between o i and
, none of the uncertain votes for overachieved candidate i should be converted to approvals. The significance of the expression in (36 − 3) is that, to maximize the moderator's influence on the voting scores for candidates whose voting scores exceed expectation, none of the abstentions should be treated as approval votes.
(iii) For consistent candidates i ∈ I 0 , by properly adjusting the values of ω j and m ij (or α ij indirectly), the model is able to achieve complete consensus between the moderator's preference and the voters' collective choice. In this case, Model (15) helps to find the moderator's optimal marginal influence y i ∈ (−1, 1), i ∈ I 0 and to achieve a complete accord. Thus, Eq. (36) demonstrates that the moderator's optimal influence over the voters can be partitioned into three categories as per the difference between his/her expectation and the voting scores of the candidates. Based on the specific category, the optimal marginal value of the moderator's opinion y i can be determined accordingly.
This result sheds structural insights into the role of the moderator in influencing the outcomes in a preferential voting. The moderator can use the statistics from polls as a proxy of the voters' collective choice and compare this information with his/her expectations. After assessing the differences, the moderator can devise optimal strategies to maximize his/her influence on voters: For overachieved candidates, the moderator can launch campaigns to undermine their positions; For underachieved candidates, the moderator has to work harder to promote them; For consistent candidates, our model helps the moderator to find the means to maintain the balance.
Numerical examples
This section provides different numerical examples to illustrate how the proposed models can be applied. First, we consider an example under the preferential voting DEA model with abstentions without accounting for a moderator's influence. Subsequently, various scenarios of the moderator's opinions are entertained to illustrate how the moderator influences the voting result differently. As illustrated by the numerical examples below, the original optimal solutions derived from the two models may result in fractional votes. We then employ the standard branch-and-bound method to find integer solutions for reallocated votes.
A preferential voting DEA example with abstentions
Assume that four candidates are competing for two places in a preferential election. The number of votes that candidate i receives for place j is denoted by v ij , i ∈ M = {1, 2, 3, 4}, j ∈ K = {1, 2} as shown in Table 1 . In Table 1 , the interval value [2, 6] for candidate 1 at place 1 indicates that the candidate receives a minimum of two and a maximum of six votes placing him/her at No. 1. Other interval values can be interpreted similarly. By assuming d(1, ε) = d(2, ε) = 0 in Model (3), the optimal solution for the four candidates is derived as shown in Table 2 1 . The optimal solution in Table 2 fails to distinguish the priority of the first three candidates because their optimal scores are all 1. To increase the discrimination power, we shall apply Model (5) next, this helps to circumvent Model (3)'s pitfall of assigning the same score for multiple candidates. It also overcomes another weakness of the DEA voting model: for the same place, different weights are derived for different candidates.
Let d(j, ε) = ε. Plugging the input information in Table 1 into Model (5) yields the maximum objective value of 0.0833.
The optimal solution leads to fractional votes for the candidates after abstentions are reallocated.
To ensure that all candidates receive integer votes, we shall employ the branch and bound method for integer programming (Little et al., 1963) .
where ⌊v ij ⌋ returns the integer part of v ij . It is apparent that one and only one of these two branches is feasible, which will be added to the original model and the other infeasible branch will be discarded. This process is repeated for other decision variables progressively and sometimes multiple rounds are needed for the same decision variable in order to ensure integer votes for all candidates. Eventually, the candidates' final weighted voting scores
] are obtained and shown in Table 3 . Without considering external influence from any moderator, candidate 3 arises as the winner. The basic setting of this example is the same as that in Section 6.1 except that the moderator's opinions are listed in the last column in Table 4 . Assume that d(1, ε) = d(2, ε) = 0.5 and m ij = ω j α ij , i = 1, 2, 3, 4, j = 1, 2, plugging the input information in Table 4 into Model (11) leads to the result in Table 5 . 
Under a moderator's influence, Eq. (38) clearly illustrates the role of the moderator: his/her optimal value is reflected in the aggregate utility of the deviation between the moderator's opinion and the candidates' voting scores.
Analytic results in Table 5 provide us an example to understand the economic significance of Corollary 7. First, the voting score of candidate 1 is 3.5 and exceeds the moderator's expectation o 1 = 3. In this case, the corresponding dual variable d * 1 = −1, implying that none of the abstentions casted for candidate 1 will be counted as approval votes. Conversely, the voting score of candidate 4 comes in at 4.5, below the moderator's expectation of o 4 = 5. As such, the dual variable d * 4 = 1, meaning that all abstentions for candidate 4 will be treated as approval votes. The aforesaid treatment of abstentions is able to maximize the moderator's influence over the voters and achieve the maximum consensus level (or the minimum deviation) between his/her expectation and the voters' collective choice. Table 5 indicates that candidate 2 receives fractional votes, which should be integers. Therefore, we follow the same branch-and-bound procedure as mentioned in Section 6.1 to find integer solutions.
The resulting votes of candidates v ij , i = 1, 2, 3, 4, j = 1, 2, and their final scores S i are shown in Table 6 . Comparing the ranking results in Table 3 (without a moderator) and 
Three cases about the moderator's influence on the voting result
To better illustrate how the moderator's opinions influence the voting result, we employ the raw voting data in Table 1 and apply the same computation process in Section 6.2. By experimenting with different scenarios of the moderator's expected scores on candidates, we obtain the following three cases (see Table 7 and Figure 1 ). Case 1 Fig. 1-1 demonstrates a case that the moderator's expectations are attainable by influencing the voters' decision, resulting in two fairly close curves between the moderator's opinion and the output based on our proposed model. Fig. 1-2 illustrates a scenario that the moderator's most favoured candidate 4 (with the highest expected score of 9) cannot rise to the top after abstentions are reallocated. This is due to the fact that candidate 4 receives the lowest raw votes (a maximum of 3 votes in the first and second place, respectively). After the moderator exercises his/her influence, the weighted voting score for candidate 4 rises to the second place, but can never reach the top given the voters' choice. For the other three candidates, consensus can by and large be reached between the moderator and the voters.
Case 3 Fig. 1-3 displays another situation that the moderator's opinion on the most and least preferred candidates differs from the collective choice of the voters as reflected in their raw votes in Table 1 . As the moderator least prefers candidate 3, he/she receives none of the uncertain votes. However, this cannot prevent candidate 3 from receiving the highest weighted score given the voters' strong support (candidate 3 obtains a minimum of 6 votes in the first place). On the other hand, similar to Case 2, the moderator can influence abstention votes to increase his/her most preferred candidate 4's weighted score, but the final score is still subject to the voters' collective choice as reflected in their raw votes.
In summary, the previous experiment indicates that the moderator's opinion plays an important role in influencing abstention votes to reach weighted vote scores that are closer to the moderator's expectations. However, this influence can by no means override the voters' choice. If the moderator's expectation is unreasonably high or low for a particular candidate (for instance, candidate 3 or 4 in Case 3), while his/her influence can increase or decrease the candidate's weighted vote score, the final score is contingent upon the voters' choice and differs from the moderator's opinion.
Conclusions
In a preferential election, invalid ballots or abstentions typically represent the voters' uncertainty about their choice. Whether abstentions are counted towards approval or disapproval votes can dramatically change the election result. This paper first generalizes Cook and Kress (1990) 's DEA model for aggregating preference rankings by allowing voting scores to assume interval values so that abstentions can be explicitly accommodated. Subsequently, an MICPV model with abstentions is proposed to incorporate opinion leaders as a moderator. This moderator can exploit his/her resources to influence voters' decision so that his expectations about the voting result can be achieved or approximated as much as possible. Different versions of the model are discussed given different types of place weight constraints. Economic interpretations of our results show how the moderator exerts his/her influence on the voters. The key features of the proposed models are as follows:
• Invalid ballots and abstentions are collectively treated as abstentions and interval values are employed to characterize voters' inherent uncertainty about the voting.
• A preferential voting DEA model with abstentions is proposed.
• A moderator is introduced into an MICPV model to represent opinion leaders/brokers whose preferences are reflected in his/her expected voting scores for candidates. The objective function is to maximize the consensus level (or minimize the deviation) between his/her expectations and the voters' collective choice over the candidates.
• The proposed MICPV model and its variants incorporate different scenarios of place weight constraints to enhance their applicability to diverse preferential election settings.
• Analytic results reveal the properties of the primal-dual variables in the MICPV models as well as their economic interpretations.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• Given that the DEA method is widely applied to evaluate relative efficiency of decision making units, the proposed preferential voting DEA model with abstentions can optimally distribute uncertain votes and, then, make better use of available voting information. Moreover, place weights are objectively determined as the optimal solution to the DEA voting model, providing a fair overall assessment of candidates' rank in a preferential election with abstentions.
• The MICPV model with abstentions and its variants not only respect voters' choice, but also consider the moderator's influence. The proposed models can also provide an optimal allocation of voting resources from a consensus angle. Key managerial insights of the proposed MICPV model and its variants are to furnish viable campaign strategies for opinion leaders in an election:
By using the poll statistics as reference points, they can devise suitable strategies to promote their preferred candidates and/or undermine their non-preferred candidates, thereby exercising the maximum influence over the voters and achieving desired voting results.
